Written by Thibault Muzergues, Political Director at Shared Ground.
In 2022, Europe painfully discovered that there was a major price to pay for dependence on one energy supplier – in this particular case, on Russia for its natural gas. Of course, this dependency was not new, it had been built up first in the 1970s as part of détente, the need (already back then!) to diversify sources after the first oil crisis, and an Ostpolitik that seemed to benefit everyone: on the European side, new pipelines meant access to what was then seen as a reliable cheap Soviet (and then Russian) gas, on the Russian side the pipelines promised hard currency that the country lacked.
It was a win-win that lasted for a few decades: in the 1980s and 1990s the Russians desperately needed that hard currency and the business was going so well in the 2000s that several countries, Germany foremost among them, decided to buy much more Russian gas, developing dependencies for which said countries have been paying dearly over the past five years. Even more so as other sources of the precious natural gas have also shown to be much less secure than previously thought (any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or to places such as the Strait of Hormuz is obviously purely fortuitous).
With hindsight, it is easy to blame this dependency on myopic vision of previous European – and in particular German – governments, even more so as, after 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, it became quite clear that Russia was no longer so reliable. And of course, Europe’s allies did at the time warn these governments about the risks they were running, including President Donald Trump during his first term, notably in a September 2018 address to the United Nations General Assembly, when his warning was greeted by smirks and laughs from the German Delegation. Nigel Farage might want to add today “you’re not laughing now, are you ?”.
This exercise in Schadenfreude, however satisfying it may be for those who, like me, warned against this dependency, is nonetheless quite short-sighted as well. In fact, it is not only Germany that is vulnerable because of its dependence on international sources of energy. France, which unlike Germany has made the (smart) choice of going for a fully low carbon primary energy source with nuclear power since the 1970s also depends on a small number of suppliers for the enriched uranium that powers its plants. The elemental source for nuclear fission is not mined on French territory, but comes from a handful of more or less stable countries, including Kazakshtan (27%, some of which might actually consist of sanction-busting Russian uranium), Niger (20%) and Uzbekistan (19%, same as Kazakhstan), with the more stable Canada and Australia accounting together for 19% of imports. True, France also relies a lot on recycling enriched uranium, and it has made a special effort to further diversify its imports, but as the country has totally stopped mining uranium on its territory a quarter century ago, this is also a vulnerability that must be acknowledged, even though it can be (partially) mitigated.
The same applies to the United States: as Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation points out in his book Nuclear Revolution: Powering the Next Generation, the United States too has developed a vulnerability – like France, it imports most of its uranium (around 70%), and its first supplier, even today, is Russia (about 20-25% of imports). Even though the consequences of Vladimir Putin stopping the export of uranium to the United States would not necessarily be felt immediately, one can only imagine what those long-term consequences would be if one of the main nuclear powers in the world were to have to scramble overnight to find new sources of enriched nuclear fuel… Needless to say, they would be serious over the long run.
I imagine that at this point, the reader expects me to write something like “well, there are actually two wonderful alternative sources of energy that are carbon-neutral, and present mostly everywhere, and those are solar and wind energy, so why don’t we go 100% on these energies”.
My answer is: actually, it’s complicated. Yes, wind and solar are available everywhere (well, a bit less in the Netherlands than in, say, Italy, for solar). But the machines that transform their power into electricity, i.e. the wind turbines and the solar panels are actually man-made, and their production depends (among other things) on rare earths. And the refining of many of these minerals is heavily concentrated in China, even when extraction takes place elsewhere than in the Middle Empire. That creates a new vulnerability – which China has been happy to exploit recently, most spectacularly in its economic war with the United States.
Even when it comes to renewables, the question of reliability of sources and dependencies is therefore extremely important – particularly in a world that is becoming more unstable, with actors that are also becoming more aggressive as a result. How do you reduce the risk in such a situation? This is what Francesco Galietti, of Policy Sonar, has done for Shared Ground in his policy paper for Italy “Between Transition and Energy Security: The case of Italy”, which we are sharing on our website.
We will be publishing a follow-up interview in our monthly podcast, so stay tuned for more on that, and Francesco will in turn follow up on it in the next Substack. This is an important reality check for all of us who care about energy (and in particular a low carbon energy) and want to make sure that the transition that is currently happening does not build new dependencies like the ones we are paying for today.
So stay tuned and join the conversation on Shared Ground’s communication channels, follow our activities on our website and on our LinkedIn page.


